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SECURITIZATION: THE CONFLICT BETWEEN PERSONAL AND
MARKET LAW (CONTRACT AND PROPERTY)*
TAMAR FRANKEL"

I.

INTRODUCTION
A.

The Source of Problems

The road to securitization - transforming debt and loans into
securities - is littered with obstacles. These obstacles seem unrelated. Yet,
upon reflection, many legal and business problems arising in the
securitization process can be traced to one source: the inherent conflict
between contract law governing personal relations among creditors and
debtors, and property law governing the same relations converted into
"commodities" issued or traded in the market among investors. Identical
terms can be characterized as contract loans in personal context, and as
personal property (securities or bonds) in market context.
There are a number of relevant fundamental differences between
contract and property laws. First, contract law historically prohibited a party
to unilaterally transfer its rights and obligations without the consent of the
other party.1 Today this strict prohibition has been relaxed, 2 but the starting
point has remained. Even when a unilateral transfer of loan contract
obligations and rights is no longer prohibited, 3 the cost of such transfers are
higher than the cost of transferring property in the form of securities.4 This
This article represents an expanded version of a speech given by the author at an
OPEC Conference in Malaysia devoted to the issues of securitization, in Kuala
Lampur on December 4, 1997.

** Tamar Frankel is a Professor at Boston University School of Law, Boston,
Massachusetts.

§ 856, at 403 (1963).

I

See 4 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS

2

See JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS

§ 18.10, at 680 (4th ed. 1998) (discussing assignment of rights); see id. § 18.28, at
700-03 (discussing delegation of duties).
3
See Tamar Frankel, The Legal Infrastructureof Markets: The Role of Contract

and PropertyLaw, 73 B.U. L. REV. 389, 401-02 & n.49 (1993) (noting development
of transfers of contract rights).
4
Compare U.C.C. Art. 9 (1995) (contract-based) with U.C.C. Art. 8 (1995)
(property-based).
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default rule is based on an assumption that in a personal contract the parties
put a high value on maintaining their relationship.
The default rule in property law is precisely the reverse. With few
exceptions, property law prohibits a party from limiting the transferability of
its rights and obligations. 5 Thus, investors, and sometimes issuers, may
transfer their rights and obligations to others without the consent of the other
parties. 6 More importantly, courts generally will not recognize unconditional
limits on transferability of such obligations.7 This default rule is based on an
assumption that parties whose obligations are commodified as financial
assets put a high value on the ability to exchange "partners" in the markets
rather than on the identity of the initial parties to the relations. Therefore, the
issuer does not care to which investor he or she owes the obligations under
the relationship. Under certain circumstances the investor does not care
whether the obligations of the issuer are owed by another issuer (e.g., upon a
merger). It is more important to each party that their relationship is
transferable.
Second, contract parties may choose any lawful terms to govern their
relations.8 In contrast, market law does not recognize the parties' agreements
that change the fundamental models of property relations. Property relations
are standardized because too many forms of property may be confusing,
leading to misunderstandings among trading parties, and imposing on them
high information costs. Thus, contract relationships can be unique and
custom-made. 9
Third, while both contract and market laws prohibit fraud, contract
law protects the parties from fraud to a lesser degree than market law does 0
That is because personal face-to-face relationships are presumed to enable
the parties to protect themselves better and cheaper than impersonal
relationships that are usually established and conducted through market
11
intermediaries.
5

See ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM ET AL., THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 2.2, at 35

(Student ed. 1984); id. § 3.24, at 155.
6

See WILLIAM L. CARY & MELVIN A. EISENBERG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON

CORPORATIONS 421 (6th ed. 1988) (discussing restrictions on transferability of
shares).
7

See RALPH E. BOYER ET AL., THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 6.1, at 117 (4th ed.

1991).
8 See Frankel, supra note 3, at 399.
9

See id.

10

See id. at 403 n.58.

II See id.
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Fourth, contract law legislation protects small borrowers against
large lenders; 12 property law legislation protects small lenders (investors)
against large borrowers (issuers). 13
Thus, legislation does not offer
protection according to the parties' position in the transaction - whether they
are borrowers or lenders - but according to their relative bargaining powers.
When lawmakers deem contract law inadequate to allow small borrowers to
fend for themselves, lawmakers protect these borrowers (e.g., against bank
lenders). 14 When lawmakers deem property law inadequate to allow small
lenders-investors to fend for themselves, lawmakers protect these small
15
lenders (e.g., against large borrowers-issuers).
In sum, legislation interfering in both contract and property law is
designed to protect the "small guys" against the "big guys." In contract
relations, the small guys are borrowers and the big guys are lenders. In
property market relations the small guys are lenders and the big guys are
borrowers. When these protective systems are combined, as they are in

12 See U.C.C. Art. 9 (1995).
13 See U.C.C. Art. 8.
14 In fact, lawmakers treat small investors in the markets the same way, but small
investors-lenders are protected against large issuers-borrowers in the markets.
15 The author notes that protections both in markets and in personal relations are
based not on whether parties are debtors or creditors, but on the perceived bargaining
power that these parties have vis-a-vis each other. In decisions involving the
definition of notes as securities under the securities acts, the courts have
distinguished between notes made in commercial transactions and notes made for
investment. See Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56 (1990); 2 TAMAR FRANKEL,
SECURITIZATION: STRUCTURED FINANCING, FINANCIAL ASSETS POOLS, AND ASSET-

BACKED SECURITIES § 18.3.3, at 223-25 (1991 & Supp. 1998). The difficulty in
classifying mortgage notes that are then distributed to the public is that they are
commercial (personal) transactions between the lender and the borrower and usually
would not provide the lender (bank) with protection. The bank is in a strong
bargaining position vis-a-vis the borrower; the bank is in the business of making
loans, and therefore is an expert in acquiring information from the borrower and
making an investment decision. In addition, the bank is an expert in monitoring the
borrower and in protecting its interests under the loan agreement. In contract, when
such notes are of small denominations and are distributed to the public, they are held
to be securities because here the borrower needs no protection and the lendersinvestors do. The investors are by definition passive and are not experts in making
loans or in monitoring the borrowers. Public policy encourages such "lending
investors" to put their money at risk, and therefore provides them with information
and other protections at reduced costs.
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securitization, 16 protections for the "small guys" borrowers raise the risks
and costs for "small guys" investors in securities.
Problems in securitization also arise from the need to use a Special
Purpose Vehicle ("SPV") as a means of converting loans into securities. The
first step in the process is loan transfers to the SPV. These transfers are
governed by personal contract law. The second step is issuance "ofsecurities
by the SPV. This issuance is governed by market property law and securities
laws.1 7 The use of SPVs distinguished securitization from the usual
securities issuances, which are issued directly to investors.' 8 The combined
contract relations and market property relations are the source of many legal
and business problems that securitization raises.
The issues raised here are not unique to the United States
environment. In fact, they exist in both law and business environments of
securitization all over the world. 19 That is because the models of contract representing personal relations - and property - representing market relations
- are near universal and because without these two models, no securitization
can occur in the first place. Thus, the discussion here applies wherever

Securitization combines personal relations with market relations by starting with
personal transactions: making loans and transferring them to a Special Purpose
Vehicle ("SPy"). The process ends with market transactions: the SPV's issuance of
tradable securities and the creation of secondary markets in the securities. In the
United States, as in many other countries, personal and market relationships are
governed by different kinds of laws. The combination of these laws in one process
poses difficulties because, in some respects, these two types of laws are based on
different premises.
17 See 2 FRANKEL, supranote 15, § 18.3.3 at 224.
18 In traditional market property transactions securities are issued to investors
directly, mostly by large issuers, who can issue a substantial number of securities in
appropriate denominations. Small borrowers are not viewed as issuers, although
technically they are. These borrowers' obligations are not traded in the markets
because the number of the obligations is insufficient for market trading and
investors' cost of information about such small borrowers is too high. See Frankel,
supra note 3, at 389-92 (describing features necessary for markets).
19 See Claire A. Hill, How Investors React to PoliticalRisk, 8 DUKE J. COMp. &
INT'L L. (forthcoming Spring 1998) (page proof at 292, on file with author) (noting
that in future flows securitization transactions investors' political risk includes risk
that legal factors may prevent firm from meeting obligations); Securitization: An
InternationalPerspective, 61 FIN. MARKET TRENDS, June 1995 (noting that some
countries' legal infrastructures are inadequate for securitization, such as-Italy and
Japan).
16
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securitization is effected, and even though the following example is derived
from a United States case, it would be applicable elsewhere as Well.
B.

Example

The difficulties of determining the applicable law at any stage of the
securitization process is illustrated by a recent United States case? The case
concerned the applicability of Rule 1Ob-5, 2 1 an antifraud provision under the
Securities Exchange Act of 193422 The facts were as follows: a construction
company planned to take advantage of lower interest rates and refinance its
mortgage loans, covering about sixty pieces of real estate. 23 The company
had various options, including issuing mortgage bonds or securitizing its own
mortgage loans by transferring the loans to an SPV and distributing securities
of the SPVs to the public 2 4 The company consulted an investment banking
firm that recommended the second option: a structured financing plus an
interim loan. 25 The deal soured. The interim loan was allegedly never
made. 26 It took a long time to obtain the necessary rating. The28 parties
disagreed on many details, 2 7 and the final contract was not executed.
The company sued the investment banker for fraud under Rule 1Ob5, arguing that the agreement between the parties concerned securities. 29 The
investment banker argued that the agreement was a two-step transaction, and
that the proposed transfer to the SPV did not concern securities and was
subject to contract law onlyo
Had the investment banker or another banking institution made the
construction company a loan and then turned around and securitized the loan,
the contract between the parties would clearly have been a loan contract and
not a contract involving a security. Had the company prepared for the
distribution of the securities and the investment banker only undertaken to
distribute the securities, there is no question that the contract would have

20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29

30

See Realtek Indus., Inc. v. Nomura Sec., 939 F. Supp. 572 (N.D. Ohio 1996).
17 C.F.R. § 240.1Ob-5 (1998).
15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78111 (1994).
See Realtek, 939 F. Supp. at 575.
See id. at 574-75.
See id. at 574.
See id. at 578.
See id. at 577-78.
See id. at 574.
See id.
See id. at 579.
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been an underwriting contract involving securities, subject to the securities
acts.

In this case, the company alleged that it was involved in all aspects
of the securitization process, and undertook the risks of credit agency
evaluations involved in securitization, but the parties anticipated execution of
the securitization process by the investment banker. The court, noting the
company's alleged obligation to rate and issue securities and the integrated
nature of the transaction, held that, for the purposes of the motion to dismiss,
the contract was an underwriting contract for the sale and distribution of the
securities. 3 1 Hence, the antifraud provision of the securities acts applied.
In sum, many of the problems involved in the stages of securitization
seem to be rooted in the conversion of personal into market transactions and
the application of combined personal and market laws to the process.
THE SEVEN STAGES OF SECURITIZATION
Securitization consists of a number of stages or steps that can be
executed separately.

H.

Making loans;
Selling the loans to sponsors or to SPVs;
Establishing SPVs by lenders or sponsors;
Providing investors with credit enhancements, usually
by third parties;
5. Distributing the securities of the SPVs, usually by
underwriters, who may be the sponsors;
6. Servicing the portfolio of the SPVs, usually by the
original lenders; and
7. Providing custody services for the assets of the SPVs,
usually by third-party banks.
1.
2.
3.
4.

Some of these steps, such as making loans, need not end in securitization.
32
But if securitization is the desired end, all these steps must be taken.

31 Seeid.at580-81.
32

These seven steps can be performed by one institution or by many institutions,

and executed in personal transactions and in the markets.
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33
MAKING LOANS

III.
A.

Consumer Protection

A number of problems for investors arose in connection with
consumer loans slated for securitization. In contrast to large issuers that can
offer their securities to the markets directly, consumer loans that reach the
markets indirectly in a securitized form could be subject to borrowers' legal
protections. These protections created for investors risks and uncertainty,
which, in turn, formed barriers to securitization or increased the cost of
capital for borrowers-issuers. In many cases the source of the difficulties
was the conflict between consumer protection and investor protection. The
following examples demonstrate the point.
1.

Usury Laws

When securitization emerged, state laws limited the interest rates that
lenders could charge consumers and mortgagors. 3 4 That posed problems for
investors in such loans, especially during inflation periods, and presented
uncertainty as to which laws applied: state laws where the loans were made
or state laws where the loans were sold? 5
6
Congress resolved this problem by preempting most usury laws?
Small borrowers were protected by market competition.
Arguably,
securitization played a major role in increasing such competition by offering
non-bank lenders other sources of financing and allowing them to compete
with banks. Market law prevailed.
2.

Prepayment Rights

A second consumer protection law allowed mortgage borrowers to
prepay their mortgages without penalty. 37 Large issuers-borrowers usually
33 Making loans also includes acquiring debts; that is, becoming a creditor or
investor.
34 See I FRANKEL, supra note 15, § 7.18.2.4, at 253 & n.22.
35 See id. § 7.18.2.3 at 249-53.
36 See Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, 12
U.S.C. § 1735f-7a(a) (1994).
37 Courts may disallow prepayment penalties under the rule that unreasonably
large liquidated damages are unenforceable as a penalty. See In re A.J. Lane & Co.
Inc., 113 B.R. 821, 828-30 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1990) (applying RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) of CONTRACTS § 356(1), 356(1) cmt. b (1981)).
Some states prohibit or limit prepayment penalties in home mortgages. See,
e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 408.036 (West 1998); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:10B-2 (West
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have the right to "call" (prepay) 20% of the bonds they publicly issue.
Prepayment is especially important for both parties in long-term loans.
Borrowers will prepay their loans when interest rates fall, and that is
precisely the time when investors would not welcome their money back.
This problem was not solved by laws abrogating mortgagors' rights
to prepay (and in most cases to refinance) without penalty. This inaction was
based on a policy to encourage people to borrow and save by investing in
their homes.38 Risks to investors from prepayments were covered by
designing SPVs so that the risks of prepayments were shifted and allocated
differently among classes of the securities issued by SPVs. That increased
somewhat the cost of capital, because investors in the riskier trenches of the
SPV demanded compensation for their risks. Further, tax laws were
amended to provide a pass-through treatment to SPVs that are organized as
grantor trusts yet allow substitution and reinvestment of the prepaid cash
without loss of the pass-through tax treatment. 39 That amendment reduced
the severity of the problem for investors. Finally, investors' market risks
from falling interest rates could also be covered by derivatives, such as
swaps. On this score, personal law prevailed.
3.

Borrowers' Defenses to Payment

A third consumer protection law that increased investors' risks
involved the borrowers' right to raise their defenses to payment that they
1989); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 56-8-30 (Michie Supp. 1996); 41 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 405 (West 1992); VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-330.83 (Michie 1993). The Federal Home

Loan Mortgage Corporation and the Federal National Mortgage Association do not
enforce prepayment penalties. See GRANT S. NELSON & DALE A.
ESTATE FINANCE LAW § 6.4, at 497, n.18 (3d ed. 1993)

REAL
(citing FNMA

WHITMAN,

§ 301.05;
FHLMC SERVICERS' GUIDE § 4.113). The Federal Housing Administration also
prohibits prepayment penalties. See 24 C.F.R. § 203.22(b) (1998).
38 It is unlikely, in light of the strong support for home ownership, that these rules
will be changed soon. However, the markets reduced the lenders' losses but imposed
CONVENTIONAL HOME MORTGAGE SELLING CONTRACT SUPPLEMENT

alternative costs. See e.g., Legal Differences without Economic Distinction: Points,
Penalties,and the Marketfor Mortgages, 77 B.U.L.REV. 405 (1997).
39 See Rev. Rul. 70-544, 1970-2 C.B. 6, modified, Rev. Rul. 74-169, 1974-1 C.B.
148; Rev. Rul. 70-545, 1970-2 C.B. 8, modified, Rev. Rul. 74-169, 1974-1 C.B. 147;

see also Tax Reform Act of 1986, 26 U.S.C. §§ 860A-860G (1994 & Supp. IV 1998)
(outlining tax treatment of real estate mortgage investment conduits ("REMIC"));
Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, 26 U.S.C. §§ 860H-860L (1994 & Supp.
IV 1998) (outlining treatment of financial asset securitization of investment trust
("FASIT")).
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may have against the original lenders. 0 These defenses could be raised
against the assignees of the loans, and that created uncertainty for investors
and reduced their ability to price the asset backed securities accurately.
For some instruments, such as notes, a partial solution to this
problem was devised many years ago by protecting the purchasers of notes
for value and without notice of the borrowers' defenses 4U Public policy of
encouraging transferability of the notes prevailed against the public policy of
protecting borrowers. However, in order to become holders, note buyers
must have possession and endorsement of the notes, unless the notes are
made payable to the bearer. 2 In securitization, the endorsement requirement
raises a serious practical problem when the number of notes involved (e.g., in
the sale of mortgage loans) is enormous, and endorsement is very costly. In
addition, the borrowers may default, and notes should be in the name of the
servicer or collector to facilitate court proceedings against the borrowers.
Usually the servicer of the SPV's portfolio is the loan's originator
and the payee under the notes. Therefore, in practice, notes are not endorsed,
and the originator remains the holder of the notes. This practice raised a
question of whether the creditors of an insolvent originator could claim the
notes. As to notes that accompany mortgages, bankruptcy law was amended
to make it clear that the mere fact that the notes are held by a third-party
servicer does not entitle the servicer's creditors to the notes. 4 3 Market law,
protecting investors, had the upper hand. 4
See U.C.C. § 3-305(a) (1998) (providing that obligor's obligation to pay
instrument is generally subject to obligor's defenses against assignee); E. ALLAN
FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 11.8, at 809-10 (2d ed. 1990) (discussing vulnerability
of assignee to obligor's defenses at common law).
41 See U.C.C. § 3-305(b) (1998) (providing that right of holder in due course to
enforce obligation to pay instrument is subject to "real defenses" and not common
law defenses); id. § 3-302(a)(2) (defining "holder in due course" in part as a holder
who purchased an instrument for value and without notice of the obligor's defenses).
42 See id. § 3-201(a) (providing that a person other than the issuer becomes a
holder through negotiation); id. § 3-201(b) (providing generally that negotiation
requires endorsement).
43 See 11 U.S.C. § 541(d)(1994).
44 Arguably, this rule would benefit borrowers. The rule would reduce the return
that lenders, who plan to sell the loans, would charge the borrowers. That is because
the investors would charge lower rates for the loans and increase the sellers' returns,
which it would hopefully share with the borrowers. The parties that would be left at
higher risk would be the lender's creditors. If the lender did not notify these
creditors, its cost of capital may indeed increase. However, the lender may find
ways to give notice to its creditors.
40
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For debts that do not involve notes, the debtors' rights prevail. To
reduce investors' costs, however, originators were willing to buy back debts
to which debtors contest, such as disputed credit card charges. In the past,
this solution raised questions about the status of the transaction as a sale of
the financial assets. Originators were interested in classifying the transfers as
sales rather than as borrowing, to improve their balance sheet. Yet, if the
originators transferred the rights to debts, but retained the credit risks, the
transactions were not likely to be classified as sales of the debts. This issue
has been resolved by an act of Congress, which allowed some transfers of
debts with recourse to be deemed sales, notwithstanding the recourse
obligations. 4 5 On this score as well, market law had the upper hand.
4.

Notice of Assignment

The magic of securitization is that it allows many small borrowers to
draw on the resources of many small savers, a source available before only to
large borrowers and issuers. However, the existence of numerous borrowers
imposes costs.4 6 Under assignment law, before the assignment becomes
binding on them, borrowers whose loans were sold must be notified of the
sale and the new payee.47 Upon receipt of notice, borrowers must pay the
assignee, and if they continue to pay the assignor, their loan will not be
discharged. This rule continues to be in effect. Even though such
notification to thousands of borrowers could be costly, it must be given. It is
patently unfair to require borrowers without notice to discover whether and
to whom their loans were assigned. This cost is usually reduced by retaining
the originator to continue servicing the loans. If, however, the servicers
change, a notice must be given. This solution meets the requirements of both
personal and market laws.
B.

Business Issues

Making loans raises a number of business issues. Standards for mass
production are far more important in markets than they are in personal
See Riegle Community Development and Regulatory Improvement Act of 1994,
12 U.S.C. § 1835 (1994).
46 When one issuer distributes securities to the public no such problem arises
because the one issuer can be notified if the trustee has changed. The trustee,
however, keeps track of the investors to ensure payments. In securitization of many
small loans the sale of the loans to a new owner creates a substantial cost. If
securitization involves structured financing of one obligor, no problem arises.
45

47

See 3 SAMUEL

WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS,

217 (3d ed. 1960 & Supp. 1989).

206-07,
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transactions. Loans that are candidates for securitization should be made
under standard underwriting principles and terms to reduce the cost of
evaluating and pricing pools of such loans. Thus, the movement of making
loans for securitization has reduced the custom-made features of the loan
making.
For example, when numerous small loans are securitized, the
traditional (personal relations) way of evaluating the credit-worthiness of
each borrower imposes substantial cost, as compared to evaluating the
creditworthiness of one large issuer. In fact, that is the way life insurance
operated many years ago. A person who sought a life insurance policy had to
48
obtain a physician's certificate on the level of his or her health.
The insurance industry reduced this cost decades ago by evaluating
people according to a profile based on a very large database 4 9 A similar
approach to loan evaluation was developed first by large banks that had data
on which they could base their predictions as to small business borrowers
with a particular profile. 50 The effects of market demands on the personal
relationship is demonstrated in the following two instances.
1.

Automated Borrower Evaluation

Recently software companies collected information and created a
database on small business borrowers for use by small banks that did not
have a database on which they could ground their credit policies. 5 1 This
database offers an automated system which predicts the credit behavior of
borrowers with particular profiles.
The result of this technique was to reduce the time for a bank to
make a loan decision from 12.5 hours to 15-20 minutes. With the quick
decisions, the time for making loans decreased and volume of loans
increased. 52 Some banks have also "outsourced" the function of evaluating
borrowers. For $5-10 per loan application, or a minimum annual $5,000
scoring, firms offer banks the service of scoring applicants for loans. This

See, e.g., Saltzman v. Fairbank Realty Corp., 144 Misc. 243, 243-44, 257(N.Y.
City Ct. 1932), rev'd 145 Misc. 478 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1932).
49 See 1 TAMAR FRANKEL, supra note 15, § 2.7, at 59-60 (suggesting that lenders
48

use the same technique, relying on statistical data to evaluate the credit worthiness of

small borrowers including small businesses).
50 See David S. Neill & John P. Danforth, Bank Merger Impact On Small Business
Services Is Changing,BANKING POL'Y REP., Apr. 15, 1996, at 1.

51
52

See id.
See id.
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automation resulted in a large additional credit capacity and in a more
53
efficient way of securitizing individual loans and small business loans.
2.

Standard Loan Documents

Securitization requires standard loan documents to establish a
predictable cash flow so that investors can price the securities backed by a
pool of such loans. The use of statistics gives an impetus for developing
standard loan documents for small businesses that could not be securitized
before. 54 Thus, the solution to the lack of standard loans was provided
mainly by the markets. Loans have been standardized by sponsors who
purchased substantial numbers of loans and dictated the terms on which the
loans will be made, 55 and by automated evaluation of borrowers, as described
above.
3.

Conclusion

Overall, the problems discussed stem from the substitution of
markets for personal relationships. Loan documents and underwriting
processes must be standardized.
Information costs must be reduced.
Personal custom-made relationships must be converted into impersonal, mass
produced relationships.
Not every small bank needs to automate its prospective borrowers'
evaluations, especially when these banks have personal, long-term
53 See id.
54 See id. The other types of loans already have this standardization. See also
Meredith S. Jackson, Leap of Faith: Asset-Based Lending to Asset-Backed
Securitization, 2 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 193, 196 (1995) (noting that as
securitization market grew, most transactions securitized common assets available in
significant volume, with predictable default rates and uniform documentation and
describing asset-based lender's use of software to provide information about small
business receivables).
55 See Neill & Danforth, supra note 50, at 1; John P. Uehlinger & John F. Bartlett,
IncreasedMomentum for Securitizing Commercial Mortgages, CONN. L. TRIB., at S24, (Apr. 15, 1996) (noting that the absence of standard loan documentation has been
an impediment to the growth of the commercial mortgage market, in contrast with
residential loans with standard documents).
In 1997, two fmancial services firms created a company to securitize small
business loans for community banks. The company planned to use automated
analysis to standardize processes and documents, write the loans to uniform pricing
and underwriting guidelines, and buy the loans from the banks. See CI ProServices
Inc. and TIS FinancialServices Inc. Announce Creation of Company to Securitize
Business Loansfor Community Banks, PR NEWSWIRE, Mar. 20, 1997, at 1.
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relationships with their borrowers. However, as borrowers follow market
trends and shop for the best deals, their long-term relationships with the
banks become shorter. The sentiment goes both ways, as banks sell the loans
they make. Lenders, including banks that wish to offer personalized
services, could do so to the smaller number of customers interested in such
services. But these customers are likely to pay more for the services. The
trend has been towards mass production at lower costs and loss of personal
relationship. Custom-made goods and services will be available, but will
cost more. The market model has become stronger.
IV.

SELLING LOANS

One of the main conditions to securitization is a clear law allowing
efficient assignment of financial assets. Both loan assignments and securities
trading are governed by the Uniform Commercial Code ("U.C.C.").
The Code has facilitated
However, the two are treated differently.
assignment and trading in securities. In addition, markets have facilitated
securities transfers by efficient settlement processes and book entries.56 In
contrast, assignments of non-securities assets are governed by personal
relations law, 57 which presents far more obstacles to speedy and inexpensive
transfer of the assets.
A.

Sale or Secured Lending?

The U.C.C. does not link assignments of financial assets that are not
securities to markets; that poses uncertainties for investors. For example, it
is unclear whether Article 9 of the U.C.C. classifies the assignment of
accounts receivable as a sale or only as secured lending. That is so even
though banks have assumed that sale of accounts receivable is possible. The
result is that rating agencies require sales of credit card receivables to comply
with the requirements of the Code (just in case), and such compliance is
costly.58
This problem is being addressed by the American Law Institute,
which drafted the U.C.C. that is followed by most states. A proposal to
amend Article 9 is likely to be approved in a year or two.59 The adjustment

56 See U.C.C. Art. 8 (1995).
57

See U.C.C. Art. 9.

58 See 1 FRANKEL, supra note 15, § 7.22, at 264-70.
59 See Alan M. Christenfeld & Shephard W. Melzer, Get Readyfor the New Article
9, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 7, 1997, at 5.

ANNUAL REVIEW OF BANKING LAW

.[Vol. 18:197

machine grinds slowly. In the meantime, contract law, with its attendant
costs, governs.
B.

Sale or Borrowing?

Another issue that has long concerned the designers of securitization
is the distinction between true sale and secured borrowing. To what extent
can sellers of financial assets retain some of the risks involved in holding the
financial assets, yet have the transaction classified as a sale? Sellers of
financial assets would retain some of the risks involved in the loans that they
sell because they can obtain higher prices for these assets since investors will
demand lower returns.
However, the accounting profession and the regulators object to
classifying a transaction in which sellers retain credit risk after a sale. For
accountants, who are in charge of a true picture of the financial position of
issuers, the removal of the loans from the sellers' books is misleading if a
significant degree of risk from the loans remains with the sellers. For
regulators, in charge of safety and soundness of regulated institutions,
retention of the risks from assigned loans does not justify reduction of capital
requirements or loan loss reserves.
A second setback to securitization occurred recently in Octagon Gas Sys., Inc. v.
Rimmer, 995 F.2d 948 (10th Cir. 1993) in which the Tenth Circuit held that
assignments of oil and gas interests that were securitized were vulnerable to
bankruptcy of the assignor. Consequently, rating agencies today reduce their ratings
of securities of assets that were securitized in Tenth Circuit territory and jurisdiction.
Private practitioners have worked out what seems to be a solution, though not a
perfect one, which satisfies rating agencies. They have moved some of the main
steps of securitization outside of the Tenth Circuit realm, to create a "reasonable
relation" of the transaction to other jurisdictions, so that Tenth Circuit jurisdictions,
such as Utah, will recognize the other laws as governing the transactions and apply
those laws should a problem arise. These lawyers have established an SPV in
Illinois. They provided that transaction payments will be made and received in
Illinois and certain transaction records will be kept in Illinois. The rating agencies
required and received legal opinions and documents that Utah recognized Illinois as
the governing state law and a true sale opinion from Illinois and from the states
which are the location of the company's subsidiaries selling their loans into the
program. See Jack Wagler, Overcoming Octagon: PartII, ASSET SALES REP., Oct.
21, 1996, at 1.
Chile has passed a law that allows the originator or transferor to establish a
subsidiary and states that the subsidiary is bankruptcy-proof - a clean, simple and
pragmatic solution not tied to the history. See Charles E. Harrell et. al.,
Securitization of Oil, Gas, and Other Natural Resource Assets: EmergingFinancing
Techniques, 52 Bus. LAW. 885, 919 (1997).
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For a number of years, regulators have imposed greater risk retention
restrictions on banks than the accounting profession has imposed on nonregulated institutions. That created for regulated institutions a disadvantage
vis-i-vis their competitors that made loans for securitization, such as finance
companies.
The conflict was resolved in the Small Business Loan Securitization
and Secondary Market Enhancement Act.60 In the Act, Congress provided a
level playing field for regulated banks and unregulated finance companies.
Banks and finance companies are now subject to the same rules regarding the
sale of financial assets with recourse and other risk retentions by sellers of
6
financial assets.

1

Among other reasons, the problem of sale versus borrowing also
stems from the conversion of instruments that were considered loan contracts
into securities.
It has become far more important to recognize the
transactions as sales of these instruments, to streamline the sale process, and
make the consequences more predictable to meet market requirements. This
resolution facilitates the sale of loans in paving their route to the markets.
Market property law had the upper hand over regulators on this count.
V.

ESTABLISHING SPECIAL PURPOSE VEHICLES (SPVS)
A.

Protecting Investors From Failure of SPVs

SPVs serve three main purposes: (i) to convert non-standardized and
unique financial assets, such as loans, into marketable standardized assets
(securities); (ii) to protect the assets held by the SPVs from third-party
claims, especially from those of the sellers' creditors; 62 and (iii) to protect

60 This Act formed part of the Riegle Community Development and Regulatory
Improvement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-325, 108 Stat. 2160 (1994) (codified in
scattered sections of 12 U.S.C., 15 U.S.C.); see Neill & Danforth, supra note 50, at
1.
61

See 12 U.S.C. § 1835 (1994).

This purpose is achieved by limiting SPVs' business to passive maintenance of
the portfolio, and ensuring that the SPVs are strictly separated and not controlled by
the seller of the assets or its related companies. Thus SPVs are currently passive
holders of portfolios that are not actively managed. Some portfolios, however, may
require more active management and continued monitoring of financial information.
Right now, such actively managed portfolios would disqualify SPVs both under tax
laws and under the exemption from the Investment Company Act of 1940. See 17
C.F.R. § 270.3a-7(a)(4) (1998). In addition, such active management may raise
62
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SPVs from failure, that is from claims of the creditors of the SPVs
themselves. Thus, the very existence of the SPVs denotes the ascendancy of
markets. They are tools for converting financial instruments to marketable
instruments, designed to reduce the costs of such conversion and limit the
63
risks that SPVs can pose to investors.
1.

Protecting Investors From Third-Party Claims

The second purpose of SPVs - protecting investors against thirdparty claims of the assets - is achieved in a number of ways and relates
mainly to bankruptcy law, mediating between investors and sellers' creditors.
This problem is not directly related to personal versus market law. Tax laws,
that allow for pass-through tax treatment of SPVs 64 as well as an exemption
for SPVs under the Investment Company Act of 1940, help strengthen these
protections. 65 The United States policy is to encourage loan securitization,

demands for more intrusive regulation. Hence,. for the time being it is unlikely that
such SPVs will arise.
See generally, Tamar Frankel, Securitization of Loans: Asset-Backed Securities
and Structured Financing,THE FINANCIAL SERVICES REVOLUTION 215 (Clifford E.
63

Kirsch ed., 1997).
64 One important issue regarding SPVs is pass-through tax treatment. The entity is
transparent and is not taxed, and passes on its earnings to the security holders, and
they are taxed.
In general, entities are taxed on their earnings; their security holders, whether
shareholders or bondholders, are taxed on the distributed dividends or interest. With
respect to financial intermediaries like banks, insurance companies, mutual funds
and other pooled investment vehicles, the Internal Revenue Code provides special
treatment. Specifically, the Code provides for pooled investment vehicles a passthrough tax treatment. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 584(b) (1994) (pertaining to common trust
funds); I.R.C. § 801 (pertaining to life insurance companies); I.R.C. § 831(a)
(pertaining to other insurance companies); I.R.C. § 852 (West 1998) (pertaining to
investment companies). One reason for this exception is that wealthy people who
have large securities portfolios can hire an investment adviser and diversify their
portfolio yet only pay tax on their income and transactions. Investment management
vehicles are "poor people's" diversified investments, and just because the pools are
regulated for the investors' protection they should not be penalized with a double
taxation. Another rationale is that if a managed investment vehicle is taxed the
taxation would constitute triple, not double, taxation because the income of such
investment vehicles is usually paid by corporate entities that are taxed as well as
their securities holders.
65 The law allows a wide variety of organizational forms for SPVs: business trusts,
limited partnerships, corporations, and limited liability companies. The choice of the
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from mortgage-backed securities to small business loan-backed securities.
Hence Congress has provided a pass-through tax treatment to SPVs holding
66
mortgage pools (Real Estate Mortgage Investment Conduits ("REMIC"))
and made it easier to use SPVs organized as business trusts that offer passthrough tax treatment (Financial Asset Securitization Investment Trusts
("FASIT")), 6 7 including

SPVs for securitizing

construction

loans

and

warehouse lines of credit. 68 The law may accommodate swaps and foreign
currency hedges, that lessen the risk of many types of mortgage
organizational form is greatly affected by an exemption from the Investment
Company Act of 1940 and by tax laws.
For a number of years SPVs had an ambiguous status under the Investment
Company Act of 1940. The Securities and Exchange Commission viewed them as
investment companies, but that Act is designed to regulate mutual funds and its
constraints made it impossible to operate SPVs. The Commission has therefore
granted applicants exemptions from some of the provisions of the Act, and these
exemptions culminated in a rule that exempted certain SPVs from the definition of
an investment company under the Act. See Investment Company Act Release No.
19,105, 17 C.F.R. § 270.3a-7 (1998).
The conditions in the exemption seem to have followed the best practices of the
industry in structuring SPVs, and has resolved the problem. The design of the SPVs,
however, must comply with the limitations and conditions of the rule. For example,
SPVs may not offer redeemable securities, and their portfolios must be fairly fixed
and not actively managed. The securities issued by the SPVs must be rated at a
minimum level. Thus, the rule regulates the structure of SPVs. It should be noted
that the law does not regulate the degree of market risk that the asset-backed
securities pose for investors. On that score investors must rely on disclosure and
make their own investment decisions.
66 See Tax Reform Act of 1986, 26 U.S.C. §§ 860A-860G (1994 & Supp. 1998).
The legislation provided relief from some of the restrictions on trusts. See
Legislative Proposal To Expand the REMIC Provisions of the Code To Include
NonmortgageAssets, 46 TAX L. REV. 299, 313-14 (1991).
67 See Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, 26 U.S.C. §§ 860H-860K (1994
& Supp. 1998).
The legislation appears to permit SPVs organized as trusts to invest money from
prepaid loans and replace them with new loans. See FASIT May Be Ready for
Prepayments, NAT'L MORTGAGE NEWS, Oct. 21, 1996, at 24, available in LEXIS
news Library, NMN File. REMICs do not allow rollovers, but FASITs do. See id.
68 See FASIT May Be Ready for Prepayments,supra note 67.
Because FASITs were designed for credit cards and other open-end revolving
debt instruments such as home equity lines of credit, the status of mortgages is not
clear. FASITs do not resolve some problems of securitizing mortgages, such as
construction loans, because these involve the risk that the buildings may not be
completed. See id.
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securitization, such as fixed rate interest payments. 6 9 All these steps help
move personal loans on the road to marketable securities.
2.

Protecting Investors Against Failure of SPVs

The third aspect of SPVs - protecting against failure of the SPVs - is
linked to the difference between personal relations and market relations.
SPVs are institutional intermediaries. They issue their own obligations to
investors, and invest the money they receive from investors in the obligations
of others. Institutional intermediaries can be classified in many ways. For
the purpose of this discussion, they are distinguished by the type of
obligations they issue and the type of obligations in which they invest, that is
whether these obligations are created in personal relations or in market
relations.
Under this classification, two prototype institutional intermediaries
on the extremes of the spectrum are banks and investment companies. Banks
mainly issue deposits and invest in loans, both created in personal relations.
Investment companies issue marketable securities and invest in marketable
securities. Banks originate loans; investment companies purchase their
investment in the markets.
SPVs are hybrids of banks and investment companies. SPVs
resemble investment companies because they issue marketable securities, and
do not originate loans. They resemble banks because they hold loans or
debts typically held by banks. These distinctions parallel the distinctions
between personal transactions and market transactions.
3.

Reducing Investors'
Portfolios

Risks

by

Diversifying

SPVs'

SPVs can diversify their portfolios. This possibility is not always
available to banks. Banks must compete over borrowers and maintain their
relationship with the borrowers. In addition, if making loans in a particular
industry or retail area may require expertise, banks may have difficulty in
diversifying their loan portfolio in other areas. This problem is ameliorated
by the development of a market for loans. Regardless of who makes the
initial loans, the market for loans allows both banks and SPVs to diversify
their portfolios. Thus, personal relations are established for making loans,
but not for holding loans, and that solves the diversification difficulty.

See id. Implementing regulations are now being prepared by the Treasury. See
Financial Asset Securitization Investment Trusts (FASITs), Solicitation for
Comments, 61 Fed. Reg. 56,647 (1996).
69
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Credit Enhancement

SPVs can reduce investors' risks through credit enhancement. One
problem relating to credit enhancement of asset-backed securities stems from
the seller-assignor's interest in removing the loans off its books on the one
hand, and the seller-assignor's interest in providing credit enhancement to
investors, on the other hand. Credit enhancement underwrites some of the
investors' risks. For the assignor, especially if it is a bank, providing rather
than acquiring third-party credit enhancement may be less expensive.
We have already mentioned the difficulties in distinguishing between
a true sale and borrowing. Congress has drawn the line in the Community
Redevelopment Act of 1994.70 However, the difficulties are not unique to
securitization, but have become more prominent with the rise of this
process. 7 1 The problems do not relate directly to personal versus market
relations. However, to the extent that credit enhancement could be bought in
the markets, and there are signs that such instruments will be developed in
the future, the question of whether the assignor can buy such instruments and
provide them to the SPV may arise. Presumably, paying for these
instruments is not the same as underwriting the risk.
Today, assignors can provide credit enhancement to investors by
investing in the equity of the SPVs. That provides investors with a cushion
when the assigned loans fail to a greater degree than expected. It also adds
credibility to the assignors' information, showing that they put their money
72
where their mouth is.
5.

Conclusion

In securitization, the focus and policy balancing has shifted to
markets. SPVs hold loans established by personal relations. However, the
ability to buy the loans in the markets enables the sponsors of SPVs to
diversify the portfolio risk. In addition, their structure allows SPVs to spread
the risk of the portfolio among the different classes of securities that they
issue and that results in matching liabilities and assets. Well-structured SPVs
cannot fail. In that sense they are more similar to mutual funds than to
70
71

See 12 U.S.C. § 1835.
Assignors also can provide credit enhancement by transferring additional

collateral to the SPVs (together with investment in equity issued by the SPV). In
both cases assignors can remove the loans off their books.
72 See 2 FRANKEL, supra note 15, § 24.4 (Supp. 1998) (citing REPORTING BY
TRANSFERORS OF RECEIVABLES WITH RECOURSE, STATEMENT OF FIN. ACCT.

STANDARDS No. 77 (Financial Acct. Standards Bd. 1983)).
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banks, even though they hold bank-type assets. As one views credit
enhancement issues, it seems that higher-risk underwriting instruments will
be available in the markets, and to that extent, the personal nature of the
credit enhancement may be diluted.
VI.

DISTRIBUTING THE SPVS' SECURITIES

The difficulties in classifying SPVs' securities relate in part to the
cross-boundaries between securities firms and banks. Today securities firms
provide loans - interim or even permanent loans - and banks and other

institutional lenders distribute securities or make loans for securitization.
The traditional division between institutions and market intermediaries has
been blurred, but the principles governing contract and securities laws have
not merged. Application of laws to institutions on the basis of their historical
specialization and limited activities no longer makes sense. Now applicable
laws should be chosen by examining the transactions in which the institutions
have engaged and their environment.
It was fairly clear that asset-backed securities were securities.
However, other related questions arose regarding the applicability of
securities acts on asset-backed securities. For example, who is the issuer of
the securities? The SPV? The sponsor of the securitization process? Both?
The distinctions are important because if bank sponsors are the issuers, the
securities need not be registered under the Securities Act of 1933 because
bank obligations are exempt from registration. 73 If SPVs are mere tools for
securitization, and the sponsors, trustees and servicers initiate the process and
possess the relevant information about the securities and the loans, they may
74
be deemed the issuers.
The analysis of these situations must depend on the public policy
underlying two different systems of law. The author believes that if a
borrower-issuer is involved in preparing a distribution of securities directly,
or indirectly through an SPV, and provides information to the public, it
See 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(2).
See Resale of Restricted Securities; Changes to Method of Determining Holding
Period of Restricted Securities Under Rules 144 and 145, Securities Act Release No.
6862, [1989-1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,523 at 80,646
(Apr. 15, 1990) (providing that servicer or trustee may be deemed "issuer" for the
purposes of rule 144A); Kutak Rock & Campbell, SEC No-Action Letter, 1990 SEC
No-Act. LEXIS 1273 (Nov. 29, 1990) (providing that release does not cause analysis
of issuer status to be different for privately placed mortgage-backed or asset-backed
securities than public offerings).
73
74
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should be subject, as an issuer, to the securities acts. But if a securities firm
undertakes to underwrite the securities of the SPV, the firm should be subject
to the securities acts. And if the firm and the borrower-issuer agreed on a
loan, and the securities firm had the option to hold the loan or transfer it to an
SPV and securitize it, contract law alone should apply to the loan and the
75
securities laws should apply to the later distribution of the securities.
Some of the securities acts conflict with business realities and needs
for securitization. In most cases, the Securities and Exchange Commission
has adjusted the rules to accommodate the process. Thus, for mortgagebacked securities, the settlement date is longer than the period applicable to
securities. 76 In addition, Rule 434 allows for provision of multiple
documents to investors but excludes mortgage-backed securities because
7
they do not lend themselves to such a form of disclosure
Further, shelf registration is available to issuers of mortgage-backed
securities, 78 and other asset-backed securities. 79 Moreover, Congress has
preempted states' "blue sky" laws that limited or prohibited regulated
institutions to invest in asset-backed securities.8 0
One unresolved issue relates to the valuation of securitized loans and
loans held by banks. In this area, institutional structure built on personal
relations clashes with institutional structure built on market relations. The
accounting profession has demanded that securitized loans and loans traded
75 See Realtek Indus. Inc. v. Nomura Sec., 939 F. Supp. 572, 579-80 (N.D. Ohio
1996).
76 See Securities Transactions Settlement, Exchange Act Release No. 33,023 (Oct.
85,232 at 84508
7, 1993), [1993 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
(codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c6-1(a) (1998)) (excepting "government securities"
from Rule 15c6-1).
77 See 17 C.F.R. § 230.434(a); Prospectus Delivery; Securities Transactions
Settlement, Securities Act Release No. 7168, [1995 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 85,620 at 86,572 (May 11, 1995).
78 See Shelf Registration, Exchange Act Release No. 6499, [1983-1984 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,449 at 86,342 (Nov. 17, 1983) (codified at 17
C.F.R. § 230.415(a)(1)(vii)).
79 See Simplification of Registration Procedures for Primary Securities Offerings,
Exchange Act Release No. 6943 [1992-1993 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 85,015 at 82,964 (July 16, 1992) (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 239.13(a)(4))
(excepting investment grade asset-backed securities from certain registrant
requirements of Form S-3); 17 C.F.R. § 230.415(a)-(x) (permitting shelf registration
for securities registered on Form S-3).
80 See Secondary Mortgage Market Enhancement Act of 1984, 15 U.S.C. § 77rl(b) (1994). Only a few states used the option to reinstate these laws.
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in liquid markets will be "marked to market." 81 The banks and bank
regulators have objected strongly, and the proposal has not yet been adopted.
Clearly, such marking to market of bank assets would create volatile bank
portfolios that may not withstand the fixed obligations that banks carry.
While banks wish to securitize their loans, legal constraints induce them and
the bank regulators to characterize their securitized loans as loans and not as
securities. 82 Volatile market prices conflict with stable bank portfolios, and,
83
some would say, with bank stability.
Also, as in the case of all securities, not all asset-backed securities
are traded and not all such securities are traded in liquid markets. Assetbacked securities have a high share of illiquid markets, mainly because many
such instruments are deemed high risk, as new and innovative. 84 Assetbacked securities therefore give rise to transition periods, when personal
instruments have been converted to market instruments but do not have
markets as yet.
VII.

SERVICING THE SPVS' PORTFOLIOS

Generally, the originators of loans retain the right to service the loans
after the loans are sold. This industry custom has developed throughout the
years, starting with mortgage loans. Banks sold loans to gain liquidity but
sought fee income to cover at least some of their costs; regulators supported
this custom. 85 In addition, continued servicing by originators reduces the
costs of notifying the borrowers of the assignments of their loans and the cost
of endorsing the loan documents to other servicers.
Securitization has given rise to the transformation of servicing
contracts - personal relations - into a species of property - market relations.

The originator of loans can sell the loans and retain the servicing rights, or
sell these rights. Unlike usual contracts, servicing contracts can be freely
assigned, except if the new servicer is not qualified. These contracts have a
81

See 2 FRANKEL, supra note 15, § 24.9-.13 (Supp. 1998) (citing ACCOUNTING

FOR CERTAIN INVESTMENTS IN DEBT AND EQUITY SECURITIES, STATEMENT OF FIN.

ACCT. STANDARDS No. 115 (Financial Acct. Standards Bd. 1993)).
82 See 1 FRANKEL, supra note 15, §§ 7.7 - 7.8.
83 See id. § 3.3.5.

84 For example, when the first commercial mortgages were securitized no markets
and no dealers were available for these types of securities, and that illiquidity raised
concerns. See Uehlinger & Bartlett, supranote 55, at S24.
85 See generally, I FRANKEL, supra note 15, § 7.10; Banking Circular 24 [19661973 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 95,308 (Apr. 16, 1970).
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market and have encouraged the development of servicers with expertise and
The property
tools to service hundreds of thousands of borrowers.
characteristics of servicing rights have ripened, as originators can add the
value of their servicing contracts as assets on their balance sheet.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

Conversion of personal to market relations presents problems in the
securitization area. The benefits of this process are not without cost.
Personal relations and protections can be lost, and institutional intermediaries
whose businesses were based on personal relations have to restructure.
Further, converting personal into market relations may require some hard
policy decisions regarding whose interests should prevail. Some of the
problems were resolved by law and some by the markets, and personal needs
have not been completely ignored. While market transactions in massproduced financial assets are sweeping the financial services field,
consumers/investors are offered refined mass-produced products in ever
greater variety to meet personal needs and tastes. "Personalized" market
relations are taking the place of personal one-to-one relations. This, perhaps,
is the answer.

